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Summary findings
(Government involvemenit in Pakistan's  agriculture  sector  sector cfforts  - although  the rationale  for a governmcnt
has benefited farmers little, contends  Faruqee.  He  presence  there  is not clear.
recommends  reforni  of agricultural policies and  Moreover,  the  underpricing  of electricity  and water
institutions.  has entailed  hidden  expenditures  that  make the
For onc  thin g, government  policy has severely  continued  provision  of those essential  inputs  financially
distorted  agricultural  incentives-  directly,  through  unsustainable.
agricultural  pricing  policy, and  indirectly  until  recently,  Basic  reform  is essential, says Faruqee. The proper  role
through  exchange  rate policy. Although  negative effects  of Pakistan's  government  should be to encourage  the
of the  government's  exchange rate  policy have been  development  of a smoothly  functioning  market,  through
eliminated,  the  indirect effects from  giving certain  institutional  and  regulatory  reform  that  facilitates market
industries  heavier  trade  protection  linger. Input  markets  efficiency and  private  sector  activities. Where  market
have been distorted  by subsidies. Those  distortions  failure is not an issue and  government  inefficiency is
dissipate  most  of the benefits directed  at farmers.  evident, government's  role should  be drastically  reduced.
T he government's  role as  an  institution-builder  also  Government spending  should  focus on public goods
needs reform.  Public institutions  have proliferated  in  and  market failures,  not oin activities hetter  suited to the
almost every  area of agriculture,  with  little benefit  to the  private  sector.  However,  the government  should
sector.  The  institutions  in research  and  extension  are  continue  to play an active role in reducing  poverty  and
particularly  weak.  protecting  the environment.
In addition,  public enterprises  have dominated
marketing  and  distribution  - crowding  out  private
This paper - a product of the Agriculture Operations  Division, South Asia Country Department I - is part of a larger effort in
the department to analyze the major issues facing Pakistan'sagriculture sector and to suggest astrategy  to improve i:s performance.
Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Clydina
Anbiah, room MCIO-376, extension  81275 (35  pages). June  1995.
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1.  Introduction
In  PakiFtan, as in  many other  countries,  the  government's  role in  agriculture  has been
extensive.  The Government  of  Pakistan seems to  have defined 'public  goods" or market  failure
quite loosely, and the public sector role has been increasing until recently.  The public expenditure
program and public institutions  are the major instruments through  which public policies  regarding
agriculture  are  implemented.  All  these  combined  --  public  policy,  the  public  expenditure
program,  and public  enterprises  -- detennine  the nature  and extent  of the government's  role in
agriculture.
The purpose  of tlis  paper is to review the government's  role in agriculture  to see whether
it has helped or  hurt  agriculture.  The paper  has four  parts.  First,  it briefly outlines  the major
policy objectives of the government  in agriculture.  Section II looks at how price, trade,  and other
government  policies (such  as macroeconomic  policies)  affect  the incentives in,  and performance
of,  the  sector.  Third,  the  paper  looks  at  the  size,  composition,  and  efficiency  of  public
expenditures.  This  section  also  examines  how public  enterprises  have performed,  and whether
they have promoted  or hindered growth  of agriculture.  Fourth,  the paper  outlines what  changes
in government  policies and role are needed for an improvement in the performance of the sector.
Policy Objectives in Agriculture
Govermment papers and documents outline the agricultural  policy goals of the govermnment
--  goals  that  have direct  impact on the sector.  In  addition,  the government  influences  sectoral
performance by other  policies  such as macroeconomic  policies.  Sector-specific  policies includes
agricultural  pricing and marketing  policies and  so on.  Economy-wide  policies such  as trade  and
commercial policies have an indirect effect on the sector.
Agricultural policy objectives are generally outlined  rather  broadly.  The key  elements of
policy goals  include  obtaining  a high agriculture  growth  rate  (in e:scess of  population  growth),
increasing  productivity  of  the  sector,  pursuing  an  export-oriented  strategy,  conserving  and
developing natural  resources,  promoting institutional  development,  bringing social and  economic
equity  to  the  agrarian  structure,  and  focusing  on  small  fanners  and  barani  (rain-fed)  area
development. These  policy objectives in principle influence government  actions  and expenditures
in agriculture.
It  is difficult to judge  the stance  of policy  from  such broad  objectives.  At the  level of
objective  setting,  problems  can  arise  since  objectives  may  lead  to  conflicting  policies.  For
' This paper  is based  on the World Bank  report,  Pakistan  -A strategy  for Sustainable  Agricultural  Growthp  I
(Report  No. 13092).  The Bank report  was  prepared  by  Rashid  Faruqee  with assistance  from  Kevin  Carey.
Moazem  Mahmood,  Nadeem  Rahi,  A. R_  Salemi,  Tayyeb  Shabbir,  Derek  Byerlee,  Omar  Nomar,  Sarfraz  Qureshi,
and Yusuf  Choudhury  prepared  background  notes,  and papers  for the Bank  report The authors  particularly
acknowledge  the contributions  of Messrs.  Sarfraz  Qureshi  and Tayyeb  Shabbir  to this paper.example, high agricultural growth is often combined with food security and the government takes
actionb to achieve the combined objective.  Maintaining a  low flour pnrce is a policy that  the
government pursues to  ensure food security, while at the same time the government wants to
promote domestic wheat production -- leaving the government with a difficult  balancing act.  If a
set  of  non-conflicting objectives  could  be  constructed,  there  is  still the  matter  of  actual
implementation. Supporting small farmers is an example where the stated objective is often not
realized. It is therefore essential to focus on the actual implementation  of govern  ten  policy (and
not just stated objectives) and, with respect to incentives,  to look at the total policy regime - both
sector specific  and economy-wide.
I.  Price and Trade Policies and their Impact
In Pakistan, all major crops are covered by guaranteed minimum  price (GMP) or support
price program.  The setting of the GMP is, in theory at least, a consultative process, that takes
into account many factors including domestic and world demand and supply, cost of production,
prices of competing crops, and intersectoral considerations. The program is designed to combat
price falls immediately  following harvest, which could force farmers with limited storage to sell at
depressed prices.  In reality, however, the public sector  intervention  has little or even negative
impact on the welfare of the farmers, as elaborated below.
The designated agencies must purchase all quantities offered to them at the GMP, if the
market price falls below the fIMP (see box). Funding these purchases is often problematic. Even
if the GMP program has helped stabilize domestic prices for some commodities,  such as wheat, it
has associated costs. Parastatals are not efficient in the handling of crops.  They also collude with
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some crops.  Complicated regulations regarding the export of cotton are in place. Anyone can
export cotton, but it is subject to a (daily-adjusted)  Minimum  Export Price (MEP), below which
no exports can take place. In addition, a benchmark MEP is set, and a variable export duty is
levied on the gap between the MEP and the benchmark  price.  The variable duty is imposed when
international cotton prices rise (as they have recently) to keep cotton in Pakistan for the domestic
textile industry. For wheat, the government maintains  the farm price below the trade price through
subsidized  imports.
Economy-wide policies also have an important effect on agricultural incentives.  Tariffs
and quantitative restrictions that protect other sectors affect the equilibrium real exchange rate.
In addition, protection to industry adversely affects the price of  traded agricultural goods vis-a-
vis other traded goods - an effect that operates in addition to the real exchange rate effect.  The
real exchange rate can be compared to the equilibrium  real exchange rate in the absence of trade
regime distortions 2, and by this measure, the estimated influence  of trade policy on the exchange
rate in the past  has been large (Table 1). However, this is a partial approach that only takes
account of one of the many  irLfluences  on the real exchange rate (see Box 2).
Table 1: Annual  Average  Overvaluation






Source:  Hamid,  Nabi, and Nasim,  Table  3.2
We assess the effect of policy on agricultural  incentives by comparing  domestic  prices to
parity  prices  (world  prices,  adjusted  for  transport  costs to  domestic  locations).  Indicators  of
protection  and  revenue  transfers  are  constructed  in  the  usual  fashion.  The  nominal  rate  of
protection  is the  percentage  by which  the  producer  price  differs  from  the  parity  price.  The
transfer into or out of agriculture is the difference between the value-added  in agriculture at actual
prices  and  value-added  at  parity  prices,  adjusted  for  non-price  transfers  such  as  subsidies,
investment, and taxation.
2 Dorosh and Valdes (1990)  compare  different  methods  of estimating  the impact on the exchange  rate of trade
policy. Another  approach  to estimating  the discrimination  against agriculture  is adopted  by Purseli and Gulati
(1993)  for the Indian case. This involves  a direct comparison  of levels  of protection  in agriculture  and industry.
We  use this approach  later in this section.
3Let us first consider the effect of policy distortions on output prices (Table 2). We present
the picture from 1960 tirough  to the mid 1980s to  provide historical perspective, and we then
provide estimates for  1991-92 and  1992-93 to  portray the  current  situation.  Historically,
agricultural producers have faced very large disincentives.  The only major change in the mid-
1980s from the historical pattern was a significant fall in protection for sugar, and more modest
falls in disprotection for cotton and irri rice.  Large nomninal  disprotection persisted for whe:tt.
More recently, note that there is some protection for coarse rice. Steep rates of disprotection
remain for cotton and wheat, and sugarcane  remains highly  protected.
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4Tabic 2: Effect of Intcrvcntions on Agricultural Priccs
Nominal Ralcs of Protcction at OffIcial and Frcc-Tradc
Exchnngc  Rates.
Crop  1960-87  1984-87  1991-92  1992-93
Basmati  -38 (-60)  -59 (-69)  -49 (-54)  a7  (2)
Cotton  -19 (-46)  -14 (-36)  -48 (-54)  -18 (-29)
Inmi  -29 (-51)  -13 (-35)  -22 (-30)  30 (14)
Sugarcanc  24  (39)  10 (-18)  70  (53)  56 (371
Vlhcat  -10 (42)  -30 (-48)  -31 (-39)  -35 (-43)
Sourccs: Hamid, Nabi, and Nasim (rablc  5.2) for 1960-87 and 1984-87, Longmirc and Debord (Table 9) for 1991-
92, and Shabbir  for 1992-93.  Before 1992-93,  wc show protcction  at both thc official  cxchangc  ratc and thc frcc-
trade adjusted cxchangc rate (in parcnthcscs).  Thc 1991-92 cstimates arc trcnd valucs and  locations are
Gujranwala  (whcat  and basmati),  Multan  (cotton),  Faisalabad  (sugarcanc),  and Larkana  (ir).
Taking Account of Input Prices
The Government  recognized  that  depressing  the  price  of  agricultural  output  could  have
adverse incentive effects, so an extensive system of input subsidies was put in place.  As the green
revolution  progressed,  the  key  inputs  to  modern  agriculture  in Pakistan  (irrigation  water  and
fertilizer) became heavily subsidized.  Electricity and pesticides also were  subsidized.  In the early
1980s,  the  pesticide  subsidy  was  removed,  and  the  fertilizer  subsidy  reduced.  There  is  still a
subsidy on  diesel,  electric  tubewells,  and  the purchase  of  seed.  A variety  of subsidized  credit
schemes  existed  and,  to  the  extent  that  agriculture  uses  imported  inputs,  it  benefited  from
exchange rate overvaluation.
It is convenient to  distinguish inputs by whether  they are traded  or non-traded.  Measures
of nominal protection  of outputs  above can be adjusted  to take account  of the fact that  price and
trade  policy  will make  tradable  inputs  cheaper,  or  more  expensive,  than  their  free-trade  prices.
The  effective rate  of protection  (ERP)  takes  this  into  account.3 Tradable  inputs  would  include
fertilizer, pesticides,  and tractors  (Box 3).  Since Pakistan  has now eliminated subsidies on most
tradable  inputs,  rates  of  effective  protection  do  not  differ  that  much  from  rates  of  nominal
protection  (Table 3). The subsidy effect of traded inputs is minuscule.
3 It shows how the value added by Pakistani farmers at current farm prices (value of tradable outputs minus value
of tradable inputs) compares with value added at social (parity) prices.  The tradable inputs considered included
fertilizer, agro-chemicals, fuel, machinery, seed, and concentrate feed.  In 1991-92, both nitrogen and phosphate
fertilizer were around 30 percent cheaper at domestic prices rather than world prices.  Agro-chemicals were about
10 percent more expensive, as was fuel.
5Table 3. Nominal and Effectivc
Raics of Protection, 1991-92  Trcnd Valucs (Pcrccntngc)
Item, Location  NRP  ERP
Wheat,  Gujranwala  -39  46
Basmati, Gujranwala  -54  -59
Coarsc Ricc. Larkana  -30  -39
Sugarcanc, Faisalabad  53  70
Cotton,  Multan  -54  -63
Sourcc:  Longmire and Debord, Tabic II. These measures wcrc constructed
using frce-tradc cxchangc rates.
More important  is the role of non-traded inputs. The combined effects of output and input
pricing on  incentives can be summarized by  the Producer  Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), which
measures the subsidy  to, or from, producers resulting  from output and input price policy (Tables 4
and 5).  To highlight  the role of non-traded inputs in Pakistan, Table 4 presents producer subsidy
equivalents and effective rates of protection side by side. Important measured subsidies on non-
traded inputs include the lack of complete recovery of operations and maintenance costs on the
irrigation system, and interest rate subsidies  on loans.
'PcOr  PnceV in.........  ..
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6Tablc 4: Effcctivc  Ratcs  of Protcction and  Producer Subsidy  Equivalcnts
for Major Crops. 1991-92  Tend  Valucs
Product  E  | PSE(%)
Wheat, Gujranwala  -46  -15
Bastati,  Gujranwala  -59  -33
I_,  Larkana  -39  -1O
Cotton, Mulian  -63  -40
Sugarcane, Faisalabad  70  92
Sourcc:  Longmuirc  and Dcbord. Tabic 16. Thcsc  mcasures  were constructed
using the free tmdc cxchange  rate
While PSEs and ERPs are not directly comparable, their respecLive  orders of magnitude can be
used to indicate relative subsidy effects.  As Pakistan has slowly liberalized its agriculture sector,
levels of  disprotection for  export crops have fallen significantly in  recent years.  However
sugarcane remains highly protected.
However,  two significant omissions from the PSE calculations are the capital costs of the
irrigation  system,  or defaults  on loans.  Both  represent  uncounted  subsidies,  and  so the  stated
figures  would  tend  to  overstate  the  adverse  incentive effects.  However.  some  argue  that  the
capital costs  of the irrigation  system were  recovered  before the  mid 1970s when  revenue  from
fairmers  exceeded current  costs, and that consequently there is no need to allocate the capital costs
of the system.
Talcing  all transfers into account significantly  reduces the extent of price distortions.  So
much so, say Longriire  and Debord, that net disprotection of agriculture was close to zero in
1991-92.  This, however, ignores serious distortions and intersectoral policy bias (see the next
subsection)  rnot captured  in subsidy calculations.  While an aggregate  estimate  may show  small
discrimination  against agriculture, overall efficiency  in resource allocation is impaired because of
significant disprotection for some crops and strong protection for others. All estimates clearly
show that there is significant  disprotecfion  for wheat and cotton Cinducing  a transfer of resources
away from those crops), whereas sugarcane is highly protected (attracting resources towards the
crop).
Moreover,  even  as price  distortions  have fallen,  the  efficacy  of  the  price  and  subsidy
regime remains in question. Simply  using subsidies  as compensation for reduced prices omits the
crucial question of whether the  subsidies are going to  the intended recipients.  Considerable
evidence suggests  that  subsidies are  not  helping  farmers,  especially small farmers.  While canal
water  may command  a price one-fifth of  its social price, who benefits from  this subsidy?  While
water  is supposed  to  be  equally distributed,  in  practice,  bribes  and  rent-seeking  determine  the
distribution  of  water  rights  (World  Bank,  1994).  Public  procurement  has  similar  abuses.
Anecdotal  evidence from the field suggests that procurement  agents exploit farmers by absorbing
most of the difference between the market  price and support price when support  price regime is in
effect.  Thus intermediaries and not farmers absorb the rents in the systemn.
7Policy  Bias  Againgt  Agriculture  Comparison  with Othcr Cotntrics
Given the  similarity between agricultural policies in  Pakistan and  India,  some useful
insights can be gained fi-om  looking at the Indian incent-vc  structurc. According to  Gulati and
Pursell  (1993), at official exchange  rates, lndian agriculturc had an efrcctive  protcction coefiTcient
of 0.86 betwecn 1980-81 and 1987-87, while in 1986-87, manufacturing's ceTcctivc  protection
cocfficicnt was 1.34. Taking account of nontraded inputs reduced disprotcction of  agriculturc
close  to  zero,  but  the  protection  of  manufacturing relative to  agriculture is  indicative of
substantial  anti-agricultural  bias within the traded goods sector, with consequent misallocation  of
resources.
According to a recent World Bank report, Pakistan also has protected industry relative to
agriculture (Table 5), at least as revealcd by import tax rates.  Import tax rates arc far lower on
agricultural  imports than other kinds of imports.
Table 5: Tradc-Wcightcd Mcan All-lnclusivc
Import  Tax  Rates, 1989-90
Wholc Economy  70.1
Agriculturc  46.7
Manufacturing  73.8
Consumer Goods  92.4
Intemiediate Goods  71.8
Capital Goods  65.5
Source:  World Bank (1992).
Of course, import tax rates are imposed rates and actual collection rates may be less; in addition
the protection may be latent, since some goods may still be produced cheaper domestically  than at
the world price. However, other indicators also point to substantial  protection for industry. The
three main industrial sectors  are  chemicals, engineering, and textiles, which receive average
effective protection of 24 percent.  In addition, the  dispersion in rates of protection is huge.
Within the  three  industrial subsectors, 70  percent  of  domestic resources  are  employed in
inefficient  and highly protected industries.  This diversion  of resources to inefficient  sectors (and to
rent-seeking)  is at the expense of unprotected sectors, including  agriculture.
Historically, over a broader range of countries, the effect of protection for other sectors
(tradable and non tradable) on agriculture has been relatively high in Pakistan. The effect of trade
policy can be quantified by its impact on nominal rates of protection for agriculture (Table 6).
The total effect can be disaggregated .ito direct and indirect efforts.  Direct effects measure the
percent by which producer prices diverged from prices at free trade (given the actual exchange
rate and degree of industrial protection). Indirect effects take account of the impact of trade and
macroeconomic  policies on the real exchange rate, and the extent of protection afforded to non-
ag,icultural  tradable cornmodities.
In the early 1980s, direct effects were having a small effect on agricultural incentives in
both Pakistan and Chile. However, indirect  policy had the effect of reducing the price received by
Pakistani cotton farmers by 35 percent relative to  the world price, while producers of Chile's
primary export crop (grapes) were only losing 7 percent of the world price for the same reason.
8So even when nicasures  of incentives wilthin  ngriculhure  show protection close to  zcro, (as the
casc of Chiile  sliows), most of the disincentivc  to  agriculture  can arisc from protection givcn to
otlier sectors (i.c. fiomii  indiiect ciTects).
Tuiblc  6. Dircct.  Indircl,  aind  Tolal  Nominal:l  Rllcs of 1'rotcclinio
for Exponcd  Products,  1980-84  (pcrccnt)
Country  Product  Dircct  I  ndircct  Total
Pakistani  Cotton  -7  -35  -42
Cluilc  Grapcs  -7  -7
Malaysia  Rubbcr  -18  X  i(,  -28
Eg,pt  Cotton  -22  -14  -36
Sourcc:  Krcugcr.  SchiWif  and Valdcs  (1988).
Pakistan also cmerges unfavorably from a comparison with  the  high-performing East
Asian economies,  which had generally low levels of disprotection of agriculture. Korea  Malaysia,
and Thailand had  substantially lower disprotection uf  agriculture (in Korea,  agriculture was
protected). 4 Thailand's disprotection of agriculture was similar  to Pakistan's in the 1960s, but the
two countries subsequently  diverged sharply.
Policy on Taxing Agricultural  Income
Agricultural income has  traditionally not  been  taxed,  and  the  political economy  of
agricultural taxation has held that agricultural  income and wealth should not be taxed because the
transfer out  of agriculture resulting from incentive policies is so  large. 5 As analyzed in the
previous section, there were significant revenue transfers from agriculture in the past, although
the transfer did not accrue to the government. In recent years the transfers due to price and trade
policies have decreased, and if one takes into account all the transfers into agriculture -- such as
credit, water, and electricity subsidies  -- there may be very little transfer out of agriculture. Haque
(1993) puts the consensus estimate of the net transfer out of agriculture at between 5 to 8 percent
of agricultural GDP.
However, even if one accepts this transfer as an alternative to  explicit taxation, keeping
output  prices lower than parity prices and offsetting this by  input subsidies is  a particularly
inequitable and inefficient  way of raising revenue from agriculture.  The output depressing effect
of  such policy can be even more serious than captured by the  price differential between the
doniestic and import priority price.  Most importantly,  under such a system, much of the transfer
out of agriculture does not accrue to the government, but dissipated as rents.  Examples of rent
dissipation include corruption in water distribution and excess capacity in the textile and flour
milling sectors.  Many of the subsidies go to unintended  recipients.  Clearly, revenue could be
generated from agriculture in a far more efficient  fashion while pursuing other worthwhile goals.
Progressive direct taxes could raise revenue ir. an efficient manner while facilitating pursuit of
4  Sce  World  Bank  (1993).
S  In the  political  economy  view,  negative  rates  of  protection  and  negative  producer  subsidy  equivalents  are  seen  as
"taxes'  on  the  agriculture  sector.
9equity.  A land tax could raise revenue and increase the incentive to  use land as efficiently as
possible.
One should note here that the sectoral classification of tax burden (direct or indirect) is
perhaps not the appropriate way of looking at the tax burden; it is  more appropriate to asscss tax
burden by income levels. Hlowevcr,  agriculture versus other sectors comparison is still important
from the point of view political economy of tax reform.  Ncvcrtheless, the guiding principle of
tax policy should surely bc that agricultural income should be taxed in the same manner as income
from any other sources.
Tax  Reform Proposals
The interim govermnent of 1993 introduced reforms in agricultural income and wealth tax
which have largely been endorsed by the Task Force on Agriculture which submitted its report in
February  1994.  The new income tax is in reality a presumptive tax based on the productive
capability of land, assessed in tenns of Produce Index Uiits (PIUs).  The tax rate will be Rs 2 per
PIU between 4,000 and 6,000 PIUs, and Rs 3 between 6,000 and 8,000 (with an exemption
below 4,000, and a ceiling  at 8,000 embodied in the land holding laws).
The rate is thus low: the maximum  tax bill is Rs 10,000 - 2,000 PlUs at Rs 2 and 2,000
PIUs at Rs 3 - or just $334.  The 4,000 PIU exemption is high - anywhere from 75 to  150 acres,
depending on location.  This makes the tax base exrmely  narrow, and the estimated revenue
yield is extremely low (about Rs 50 million).  Finally,  the PIUs themselves are based on a decades-
old assessment, and the tax base is now very outdated.  It is also not clear that all loopholes have
been closed. Once the PIU-based liability  has been paid, agricultural income can still be used as a
tax shelter.  When land fimctions as a tax shelter, then land use is distorted.
An agricultural wealth tax is also in place; agricultural land will be valued at Rs 200 per
PIU.  There is a basic exemption of Rs  I million, below which no wealth tax is paid.  There are
also exemptions for a  farm house, agricultural machinery, farm  vehicles, and Rs  100,000 of
agricultural land. Tax is then payable at a sliding  scale of 0.5% to 2.5% in blocks of Rs 400,000.
Finally, agricultural wealth is not added to non-agricultural  wealth for the purposes of determining
tax liability. Like income tax, the wealth tax base is narrow and outdated; exemptions are high,
rates low; and, the principle of horizontal equity  is again not satisfied.
Of paramount importance is the basic principle  that all income  should be taxed in the same
manner, regardless of source.  The size and direction of resource flows between different sectors
should not be relevant to any individual  tax liability  for a given amount of income. The revenue-
generating capacity of  agficultural taxation will increase with  improved price policy and the
removal of distortions in input markets.  Progressive direct taxes on income and/or land would be
desirable and such a system wil  have to replace the current system of inefficient  and inequitable
resource  transfer and  commodity-specific taxation,  wiLth  the  possible exception of  taxes  on
commodities in which Pakistan has market power."  Large farmers have very low payment rates
for services, wkich increases  their gains from the current subsidy  regime.
6  Paklstan  likely  has market  power  in conon  Howevcr  static  optimal  tariff argumets have  not worked  well  in
the dynamic context and Pakistan's market  power in cotton is being eroded by the emagrnce  of new producers.
10Policies Affecting  Input Markets
Government policy is also creating constraints in input markets. Timely availability  of
fertilizer is essential, but phosphate, now being imported by the public sector, is rarely delivered
on time, and usually in insufficient quantities, with a resulting imbalance  between nitrogen and
phosphate use.  While the recommended  ratio is close to  1:  1 for most crops, Pakistan's ratio is at
best 3:  1.  Despite the fact that the import of phosphate is late year after year, the government
seems unable to respond to the problem.
Fertilizer policy is imposing large hidden costs  on farmers, including search costs for
scarce supplies, uncertainty about availability leading to  panic buying, and  depressed yields
through lack of availability  at the required time.  These costs mean that any benefit to  farmers
from lower prices is being dissipated.
The benefit of a  liberalized input market is evident from the extraordinary growth in
pesticide use after  the subsidy was ended and entry to  the market was liberalized.  Indeed,
widespread pesticide use is widely held to  explain the dramatic growth in cotton yields in the
1980s.
Fertilizer pricing policy also has harmful intersectoral effects. Natural gas prices for state
run fertilizer corporations in Pakistan are held belc;.v  prices for other users, with the objective of
reducing  the price paid by farmers for fertilizer. The problem is that this natural gas pricing policy
reduces the  availability  of gas for use in industry.  In an energy-deficient country, this is an
expensive  way to offset agricultural pricing  policies.
Use of improved seed has been held back by problems of availability,  accessibility, and
quality.  On-farm research has estimated that use of old varieties of seed could be depressing
yields by 15 percent.  As in fertilizer,  goverrment policy is causing distortions.  Private seed firms
have to compete with a large public sector producer which prices uneconomically  and runs losses.
Private seed  development is also held back by non-existence of  breeders' rights and  lack of
trademark protection.  Enforcement of laws regarding seed quality is lax.  Little work is now
being done to develop seeds for fodder crops and high value food crops.
Factor markets have also been distorted by govermment  policy. Apart from tractors (see
Box 3), the cost of agricultural mechanization has been further lowered by the access of large
farmers to subsidized credit. Research from Pakistan and elsewhere has shown that mechanization
has far greater labor-displacing  than output enhancing effects.  While some mechanization  was
inevitable, policy induced lowering of tractor  prices led to  premature tractonization and labor
displacement.
Agricultural  Credit
Research generally finds that higher credit use is correlated with higher input use, and
possibly higher output.  Credit is also important in alleviating poverty, particularly in financing
small-scale  projects in the rural non-farm sector.  Export horticulture, a likely source of future
growth,  requires  substantial investment, both  short-term and  long-term,  which  the  present
financial  system is incapable of meeting. Land mortgages are usually not sufficient to cover loan
requirements, and the specialized  nature of horticulture equipment lowers its value as security in
the event of default.
Figure 1 shows the formal agricultural credit disbursed since 1981 by the major lenders to
the sector.
11Figure 1: Credit Disbursement
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Lending by all agencies increased until 1987, and by the Agricultural  Development Bank
of Pakcistan  (ADBP) until  1990, followed by  stagnation.  That,  and  the  recent  bailout  of
agricultural cooperatives by the government are all signs of serious problems in the rural financial
system in Pakistan.
The formal credit sector lacks dynamism.  Two institutions (ADBP, and the Federal Bank
for  Cooperatives) comprise virtually the  entire formal sector.  Both have failed to  mobilize
deposits, and rely on transfers to maintain lending capability.  Deposits have been discouraged
through interest rate ceilings and the availability of more a tractive goverunent  bonds. Cheap
financing from the public sector gave the state banks no incentive to mobilize deposits.  Prudent
financial  regulation of the institutions  is non-existent.
The 1972 Banking Reforms forced commercial  banks to meet a target level of lending to
the  agricultural sector.  Quotas were also introduced for lending by size of farm. Lending is
conducted at non-economic rates, for non-viable projects and is directed to large farms, and the
rural elite.
As in many developing countries, the credit system has poor enforcement and, Zo, many
non-performing loans. Attempts at recovery can take years.  Almost 30 percent of the US$100
million  that farmers spend on tractors each year comes from loans that eventually  turn bad.  Thus
distortions in the credit market have wider effects: in this case, they lower the price of tractors
and introduce a major distortion in factor prices.
Collateral requirements are a major obstacle to small farmers.  Amongst small farmers,
credit access has increased much faster for owners  and owners-cum-tenants than for tenant
farmers.  Nevertheless, there is a bizarre side to  the use of land as collateral - foreclosures are
non-existent. This obviously  gives rise to perverse incentives.
The use of crops as collateral has been proposed as a partial solution to the lack of credit.
This, however, exposes the bank to much  additional risk - variability  in the price of the crop and
the chance that the purchaser might not pay for the crop. These risks are present for all crops, but
are particularly pronounced for horticultural export crops.  Banks do  not have the  technical
1Icapability  to assess or price these risks, and would likely constrain lending even if the use of crops
as collateral  was permitted.
Informal finance,  which is estimated to account for 70-80 percent of agricultural credit, is
geared towards meeting short-term credit and consumption loans.  This is partly because most of
the  informal sector  is  illegal.  Long-term investment and  saving needs  are  correspondingly
neglected. Small farmers have generally not been drawn into the institutional credit system -
despite official  statistics showing that most institutional  credit goes to small farmers.
Commission agents and merchants have remained an important source of credit, even as
formal credit provision has greatly expanded.  They use tying arrangements as a substitute for
collateral, apv interest rates are usually much higher than in the formal system. Noninstitutional
rates are far higher than institutional  rates.  These higher rates partly reflect informal lenders' high
screening costs (Aleem, 1990).  Since collateral  is rarely available  in the informal  market, lenders
must undertake costly assessments  of default risk themselves.
Even in the informal market, rejection rates are high - over 50 percent in one village in
Sindh.  While this would include some projects that would not be viable at any positive rate of
return, it also includes some projects with long gestation lags, or projects that would be viable
from society's perspective but not at the lender's required rate of return.  In this same village, it
emerged that the main cost to  lenders arises from delinquent payments, which the lender must
pursue.  Aleem also finds that market equilibrium  involves many lenders, each making a few small
loans.  Thus the average cost per loan is high, reflected  in informal sector interest rates.
Sources of the Problems: The rural finance system has been used as an ineffective  conduit
for transfers to the poor. Rationed credit will inevitably  be captured by the better off. Credit was
seen as a tool for offsetting the transfers from agriculture resulting from output price policy.
Some problems with enforcement can be traced to inadequacies in the maintenance of property
rights.
There are structural issues that would hinder the credit market even if policy distortions
were  nonexistent.  First,  financial intermediation is  inherently  difficult in  predominantly
agricultural rural areas.  Clients are dispersed, so the cost of serving them is high. Pakistan's poor
infrastructure does not help. The cost of gathering information  about projects is also high.
Second, and  more  important,  farner's  incomes are  subject  to  common influences.
Insurance is difficult  and liquidity  needs are highly seasonal - everyone needs liquidity  at the same
time, and everyone wants to save at the same time.  Aleem (1990) estimates that seasonal needs
accounted for 50 percent of the total demand for credit of a typical farmer in his sample.
Since liquidity needs are correlated across space and time, banks need to  be allowed to
intermediate in different markets.  This creates  an inherent tension: while information about
projects resides at  the local level, which would suggest the  usefulness of  specialized credit
provision, such a specialized  provider would be unable to diversify  to meet insurance and liquidity
needs.  The problems  in the credit market are reinforced  by policy failures in other areas.  Since
agriculture is likely  to be credit-rationed even in a freely functiening credit market, the net worth
of farmers will be an important determinant of credit availability. More profitable farmers will be
better able to  self-finance projects and so increase investment in agriculture.  Therefore, the
incentive distortions described above, by lowering agricultural incomes, have compounded credit
rationing problems. Policy reforms in other areas that raise incomes in agriculture may thus help
to boost investment  in the sector.
13111.  Public Sector Institutions, Services, and Expenditures
The government's active role in agriculture is manifested in  public sector agricultural
institutions, service provision, and expenditures.  In practice these areas overlap, although in
principle they need not.  For  instance, the  government cou!d fund the  provision of services
without being actively involved in the provision itself.  The key role of  the public sector in
agriculture -- as is the consensus among development economists  and policy analysts -- should be
to provide an enabling environment  for private-sector agriculture,  while assisting in reducing rural
poverty, and ensuring sustainable  resource use.  This means that govemment will have to confine
itself to certain functions (Box 4).
Government  intervention, even  in  legitimate areas,  can  be  problematic.  While the
government may appear to be intervening to correct a market failure for the public good, in fact
intervention may be serving private interests, including  those of the public officials  themselves. In
areas where government has no  legitimate role, those benefiting from intervention become a
strong force to maintain  the intervention.
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Institutions and Services
Public institutions  have proliferated  and the provision  of  most major services has a
significant public sector  presence (see  Table  7).  Their activities range  from  input  supply,
infrastructure provision, regulation, resource mnobilization,  and output price intervention, across
federal and provincial levels of government. The broad range of activities in Table 8 clearly  goes
beyond what would be considered legitimate areas for intervention.  The table also indicates the
likelihood  of considerable  inefficiency  and duplication  of functions  between institutions.
Over-representation of the public sector is most pronounced in input supplies (see the
section on public enterprises below).  Public-sector entities  that handle major inputs are inefficient,
14inflexible, and often unresponsive to market conditions.  Take for example,  the aforementioned
shortages of phosphatic fertilizer year after year:  this is usually  blamed on transport problems, but
this begs the question of wlhy  the planning  of imports cannot begin sooner.
Public presence in input provision has stifled the growth of the private sector, leaving the
private producer starved of inputs at the right time or in the right place.  This contributes to the
inefficiency of  other  agricultural support  services.  For  examrnle,  if seed  or  fertilizer is not
available  when needed, the impact of public research and extension is diluted.
There are inefficiencies  and weaknesses even where the public sector has a legitimatc role.
Duplication  of functions or poor coordination between agencies are serious problems. In cotton,
for instance, there is a multiplicity  of research institutes, with overlapping functions.  The federal
Pakistan Central Cotton Committee is responsible for research on cotton, while Punjab and Sindh
have cotton institutes. The Atomic Energy Commission  also breeds cotton varieties. Both Federal
and provincial research institutes work on  the  same conmmodities  or  areas  with  little  or  no
coordination. The same problem exists with adaptive research within the provincial research and
extension departments. Inadequate coordination between WAPDA and PIDs during planning and
implementation of  irrigation and  drainage projects makes the  task  of  future  operations  and
maintenance difficult.  There is also poor coordination of on-farm water management programs
between the Ministries of Agriculture and Water.
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Activilylcommodity  Federal  Puniab  NWI'I'  Sindi:  Ballchisizrn
INI'UI'S
lAnd  BOR  13OR  130R  110k
Fertilizer  MINFAC(FU))  PAD(PADSC)  PA)(AD)A)  P'AD(SASO  PA)
NFC/NFML
Seed  kfINrAC(FSCD)  PAD(PSCY  PAD(ADA)  PAD(SASO)  PAI)
Water  MIOW&P  PID  PID)  I'll)  PID
MINFAC(I:MWC)  PAD(OFWMNID)  PAD(OFWNID)  P'AD(OI:WMI))
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AEri.  IINFAC(IPPPD)  PAD(PADSC)  PAD(ADA)  PA)(PAI.D)  PAD((PAkIX)
Forestry  MIINFAC  PFD  PFD  l'FI)  PFD
PFD
LivestockC  MIINFAC  PLD  PLD  PlD  PLD
PLD
Fisheries  IMINFAC/IFD  PFD(PFSD)  PI1XPFSD)  PIlD(Pl:SD)  P19D(PFSD)
Machinery  MINFAC  PAD(EngD)  PAD(Engl))  PAD(I.ngD)  PAD(EngD)
Soil Conservation  MbNFAC  PAD(SCD)  PAD(SCD)  PAD(SCD)  PAD(SCD)
Research  MINFAC(PARC)  PARLVAUF/  AUP/  SARD/SAU/  BAR13ARIS
(AZRI)  ARIS  ARIS  ARIS
(PCCC)KARINA
Training
Inigation  MilRIS  PIRI
(I WARSI /(DRIP)
Forestry  hINlFAC(PDI)  FSS  FSS  FSS  FSS
INFRASTRUCTURE
Electricity  MOW&PIWAPDA
FTNM  Roads  MLG&RD  LG&RDD  LJG&RDD,  LG&RDD  LG&RDD
Minor Irig.  lMfOW&P  PID  PID  P11  PID
REGULATION'INTERVENTIONS
PricseS  AFCOM
Inigation  WAPDA  PID  PID  PID  PID
Seed Certif.  MINFAC(FSCD)
Electricity  WAPDA
Quality control  Food & Drug Insp.
Environment  PEPA  EPA  EPA  EPA  EPA
-RESOURCE  MOBILIZATION
Land Revenue  Collector  Collector  Collector  Collector  Collector
Ushr  Collector  Collector  Collector  Collector  Colletor
Octroi  DC  DC  DC  DC  DC
Abiana/Drainage Cess  Collector  Collector  Collector  Collector
AG. STATISTICS  MINIAC(CH)  CRD  PAD(SDIR)  PAD(DSIR)  PAD
AG. CENSUS  SD(PACO)
oUT1rurs
Procurement  PASSCOIRECP  PDF  PDF  PDF  PDF
GOP/CEC
16AMII  II  IVIAT1'I()NS  SAU  Sindh Agricultural  University
ADA  Agricultural Develupment Authority  S13P  State Bank or Pakistan
ADB3P  Agricultural l)evelopment  13ank  uf Pakistan  SCD  Soil Conservalion  Directorate
AMIRI  Agricultural NMaciniiery  Research  histitute  SI)  Statistics  Division
APCOM  Agricultural P'rices  Commission  SDIR  Statistics  Directorate
AR]  Agricultuial Research  Institute  SRPO  Sindh Regional  l'lanning Organization
ATI  Agricultural Training Iistitute  SSC  Sindh  Seed  Corporation
AUP  Agricultural University of Peshawar  WAPDA  Water anl Power  Development  Authority
AUF  Agricultural university  of Faisalabad
AZRI  Arid Zone Research Institute
BAC  Balochistan  Agricultural College
BARB  Balochiistan  Agricultural Research Board
BOR  13oard  uf Revenue
CEC  Cotton Export Corporation
Collecto-  District Collector
CRD  Crop Reprting Directorate
DC  District Council
DRIP  Drainage  and Reclanation Institute  of
Pakistan
EngD  Engineering Directorate
EPA  EnvironmeLntal  Protection  Agency
EW  Economic  Wing
FBC  Federal  Bank of Cooperatives
FID  Fertilizer Import Department
FS  Forest  School
FSCD  Federal  S-eed  Certification Department
FRI:  Farm-to-Market
FWMC  Federal  Water Managernent  Cell
GCP  Ghee  Corporation  of Pakistan
IWARSI  InternL  ational  Waterlogging and Research
Institute
KARINA  Karrakoram  Agricultural  Research
Institute for Northerr.  Areas
LG&RDD  Local Government  and Rural Development
Department
MFD  Marine  Fisheries  Deparument
MIINFAC  Ministry of Food,  Agriculture and
Cooperatives
MlRI  Mona Irrigation and Reclamation  Institute
MLG&RD  Ministry of Local Govermnment  and Rural
Development
,MOW&P  Ministry of Water and Power
NCBs  National Commercialized  Banks
NFC  National Fertilizer  Corporation
NFML  National Fertilizer Marketing Limited
OFWNMD  On-Farm Watle Managenent  Diretorale
PACO  Pakistan Agricultural Census  (P-ganization
PAD  Provincial Agriculture Departnk  nt
PAED  Provincial  Agricultural Extens5n
Department
PARB  Punjab  Agricultural Research  1hoard
PARC  Pakistan  Agricultural Resew-ia Council
PADSC  Punjab  Agricultural Development  and
Supplies  Corporation
PASSCO  Pakistan  Agricultural Services  and Storage
Corporation
PCCC  Pakistan  Central  Cotton  Comunittee
PCD  Provincial Cooperatives  Depatment
PDF  Provincial Department  of Food
PEPA  Pakistan  Environmental  Protection  Agency
PFD  Provincial Forest  Deparmnta
PFI  Pakistan  Forest  Institute
PFsD  Provincial Fisheries Departnent
PID  Provincial Irrigation Dcparlmcnt
PIRI  Punjab  Irigation Rescarch Institute
PLD  Provincial Livestock Dcpartment
PPPD  Pakistan Plant Protection Department
PSC  Punjab Seed Corporation
RECP  Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan
SARO  Sindh Agricultural Rescarch Organization
SASO  Sindh Agricultural Services Organization
17Property  rights  in  agriculture  are  monitored  by  land  management  institutions,  which
operate  at the provincial level.  The land records  system is cumbersome  and outdated  (Box  5).  A
streamlining of the system is a pre-requisite for smooth functioning of the land market.
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Environmental protection agencies, at  both the federal and provincial level, still suffer
from lack of trained manpower and have taken a long time to become functional.  For example, the
Pakistan Environmental  Protection Council (PEPC) was created in 1983, but met for the first time
in 1993. Provincial environmental  protection agencies have been active for some time. However,
federal-provincial linkages  are  still very  weak,  and  coordination  among  the  provinces  is  non-
existent. Regulatory bodies, such as seed certification, quarantine, market monitoring, and quality
control, are spread too thinly, and are not performing at the optimal level.  For instance, a third
successive poor  cotton harvest in  1995 is blamed on widespread pesticide adulteration due to
non-enforcement  of quality regulations.
Nowhere, however, is the weakness and inadequacies in public sector institutions more
evident than in the areas of research and extension.  In fact, deficiencies  in research and extension
have been highlighted as a factor explaining  lower productivity growth in Pakistan compared to
India. Rosegrant and Evenson (1993) have shown that there was a dramatic decline in total factor
productivity growth in agriculture in Pakistan after 1975 that did not occur in India. They argue
that this can be explained by the level of investment in public research, extension, and literacy,
which increased in India after 1975, while falling in Pakistan.
Research:  There is a lack of funding in general for research and operational funds in
particular.  The  effectiveness of research has  declined because of  lack of  material support,
effective planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the  research program. Researchers lack the
proper  equipment  and journals  (notably foreign journals),  leading to  a  very  poor  research
environment.  There is an apparent proliferation of research institutes (universities, PARC, NARC,
provincial  research and monocrop institutes), often with overlapping  responsibility and duplication
of research.
18Agricultural research broadly covcrs two areas -- plant breeding research and crop and
resource managenient research (CRMR). Plant breeding research has been satisfactory, although
the lag in getting research to  farmers is often long.  In wheat, the average age of varieties in
farmers' fields is  about  1l  years,  compared to  an  average of  about  7 years for  developing
countries.  This reflects failures in extension and seed marketing. There is much duplication of
effort in breeding research, and economies  of scale could be realized if some breeding institutes at
different  levels of government were consolidated.
Crop management research emphasizes  increases in productivity through research on such
issues as timing and method of application  of input rather than type of input, and land preparation
and harvesting.  Resource management  research focuses on preservation of the natural resource
base.  For most crops in Pakistan, it is difficult  to find good examples of CRMR which have been
translated to farmers' fields. Much evidence indicates that key inputs such as water and fertilizer
are inefficiently  used.
Existing research has failed to increase input efficiency. Outcomes from well-controlled
experiments need to be better tailored to farmer conditions. Issuing technical packages to large,
heterogeneous groups of farmers is not enough unless farmers have the means to  adapt these
packages to their own circumstances. Crop and resource management research lacks a systems
perspective. Specialized research  tends  to  ignore  interactions between  different crops  and
different agronomic issues.  Key long-term issues such as necessary natural resource investments
are generally  ignored.
Extension:  Most  studies indicate that the variables that consistently explain farmer
inefficiency  are farmers' knowledge and skills. As emphasis  switches from input intensification  to
input  efficiency, improvements in  information and  skills play  a  bigger  role  in  increasing
productivity. The information burden on farmers will only increase as agriculture becomes more
conmmercialized  and sustainability issues come to the fore.  Extension thus has a central role in
improving productivity growth, and also in making the distribution of benefits from knowledge
more equitable.  Small farmers may find it more expensive to acquire knowledge, and so public
extension has a role in equalizing access to new methods.
Extension prograxns are  a  significant item  in  the  current  agricultural budget  of  the
government but their impact is negligible. An elaborate extension system is already in place for
crops, but many farmers question its usefulness. Organizational problems are severe (especially
lack of accountability),  and operational funding  for extension workers is low.  The desired ratio of
wage to operational (non-wage) expenditure  in agricultural research is 60:407,  but the prevailing
ratios many of the provinces  are in excess of 80:20. For instance, in NWFP, the ratio of salaries to
operational expenditure actually deteriorated from 75:25 in  1982-83, to  85:15 in  1992-93.  In
addition, the salary  budget is spread too thinly over extension staff.
There are now over 5,000 village extension workers (EWs) but they often lack adequate
training, which makes their task of improving the management skills of farmers very  difficult.
Palcistan  Public Expenditure Review, World  Bank, 1992.
19Extension workers with higher education and communication  skills are often likely  to be assigned
administrative  responsibilities. The system is characterized  by a one-way transfer of technology to
a fevy  inadequately  selected farmers. Women and small farmers are often ignored. Feedback from
farmers is poor.  In contrast to the system for crops, livestock forestry and fisheries  are neglected.
Nor is it fully integrated with water management extension -- a clear obstacle to improving the
efficiency  of water use.
Much effort was made in the 1980s to implement  the training and visit extension system
(T&V). It appears that the system had only modest success. Measures of farmer contact do show
an increase, and extension services may have had impact on increasing pesticide use. However,
Husain et al (1994) could find little evidence that T&V had improved the q2uality of extension
advice. An increase in extension contact does not necessarily show that  extension has aided
growth.  In addition, contact is highly skewed towards large farmers.  A survey of  extension
contact in Punjab in 19868  showed that 60 percent of farmers with over 10 hectares of land had
contact with the extension service in the previous year, whereas only 24 percent of farmers with 5
to 10 hectares had contact c- er the same period.
Moreover,  some success  of the  T&V system can  be explained by  the poor  state  of
extension service before the system was introduced. By introducing organizational discipline  and
some additional funding,  the T&V system was able to improve the previously deficient extension
services. It is less clear, however, that the system was the most cost effective  use of resources. It
involves  a  centralized, hierarchical approach that  linit;s feedback  and  adaptability to  local
conditions.
The quality of extension services does not compare favorably with India.  Husain et al
(1994)9 find that although the Training and Visit system has increased the quantity of extension
advice (visits, messages etc.), it does not appear to have increased farmers technical knowledge or
the rate of adoption of new technology.  This contrasts with evidence from a comparable region
of India.  Two major problems specific to Pakistan are identified. First, implementation  of T&V
was lacking. For example,  one survey found that 20 percent of contact farmers did not know that
they were contact farmers, and hence the information flow never went beyond them.  Second,
messages were inappropriate to  farners'  circumstances, and  ignored  the  rational  and  often
location-specific  tradeoffs that farmers often make. For instance, messages about wheat continue
to  assume that wheat  will be  planted on-time, whereas farmers often rationally delay wheat
planting as a result of interactions in double-cropping  systems.
Public  Expenditure
Pakistan is one of a  group of  countries that followed a  policy of compensating  for the
discrimination  against  agriculture  in price policy  with heavy  investment  in nrral infrastructure  (notably
irrigation),  agricultural  institutions,  and subsidies  to water, credit, electricity,  and fertilizers. We have
s Byerlee  (1994).
9 Cited in Byerlee (1994).
20aIready shown how these individual  components of this policy have been undermined,  but it is also
instructive  to  look at the broader picture of expenditure. The most useful way to evaluate public
expenditure  is in terms of its composition  and efficiency. A basic classification  is between current
expenditure  and development  (capital)  expenditure. Tables 8 and 9 provide a breakdown  of each type
of  expenditure at the Federal and Provincial levels, with figures also provided for some major
categories of expenditure  within  each class. Current expenditure  has iisen sharply  while development
expenditure  has fallen,  which  indicates  that public  investment  in agriculture  has been squeezed  by other
types of spending  of dubious  benefit to agriculture. However,  the development  budget itself  includes
items that would not normally  be considered part of investment  in agriculture,  such as the fertilizer
subsidy.  Pakistan's subsidies  have typically  been untargeted  subsidies  where the payment  depends  on
the level of activity of the farmer; this creates an immediate  bias towards larger farms.  The natural
tendency  towards rent-seeking  by bureaucrats  and farmers  is only likely  to exacerbate  this bias.
21Tahle  8
PAKISTAN: PUBLIC EXPENDITlJRE IN AGRICULTURE
(Current)
Constant Rupees - millions
19S2-.3 19S3-S4  1984-S5  1985-86  19S6-S7  1987-8  19S2.89  1989-90  1990-91  1991-92  1992-93  1993-94  Growih  Rate
Puniab
Crop  Agriculture  260.19  299.34  306.35  331.97  261.15  383.02  254.05  333.18  344.49  377.88  366.1S  37S.32  4.13
Irri. & Land Reclaim.  876.10  949.19  1039.23  1101.56  150.54  732.94  973.76  90S.47  930.S6  1252.12  1070.57  1302.07  4.42
Total Punjab  1340.26  1505.39 1615hOS  1756.00  1872.56  15  159S290  1579  52  1632i63  1990.69  1gQ4L32  2104712  LB
Slndh
Crop  Agriculture  88.21  122.89  109.14  127.14  134.31  144.52  140.20  157.79  166.83  185.25  156.02  153.63  6.74
Irrigation  264.78  304.17  329.89  353.50  394.84  405.46  411.71  373.90  352.54  355.49  358.87  343.55  2.70
Total Sindh  43C076  22  639238  658.19 659.09  642L65  650.72  67622  656.57 a=  Lk
NWFP
Crop Ariculture  70.51  85.66  114.41  115.60  120.35  120.81  113.41  106.22  106.82  116.40  122.13  130.13  7.69
Irrigation  94.76  108.55  129.00  147.65  222.00  216.0S  244.95  235.27  238.70  237.77  253.06  234.S7  13-34
Total NWFP  L42  16.49 2I  3A064  U24L1  426.21 450.86  a222  447.S8  474.9S  D8
I'lnclllhtan
Crop  Argiculturc  56.63  65.92  73.29  22.08  95.00  104.70  107.75  103.95  100.09  119.25  135.40  143.44  13.93
Irrigation  71.21  65.53  66.41  88.81  84.72  73.38  76.97  62.36  60.01  73.19  73.52  76.13  0.63
Total  Balochistan  167.66  t7.3  1=22  228.15  251.98  253s9  253  24236  244J1  ZI2A  2991s  3I4.75  Z21
Federal Govcmmient
Subsidies  na  na  2744.00  1318.00  112.00  236.00  4751.00  2501.00  2229.00  1914.00  978.00  492.00  na
Wheat & Sugar Suhsidy  na  na  1039.00  1318.00  112.00  236.00  3076.00  1852.00  1179.00  1830.00  978.00  492.00  -0.73
Edible  Oil Subsidy  na  1179.00  1704.55  0.00  0.00  122.00  1675.00  649.00  1050.00  84.34  0.00  0.00  -10.00
Total  Federal  14551  10946  2917.00  1497.60  3125  413 47  4919.00 2670.00 2393.0  2080  1196.00  66239  _so
Total  National  Current
Expenditurcs  UQ  2571.68 670s.83  5900.06  5337.21 5542.17  2Q22L  556347  634360  6320.94  5310.15  109947  .L2
Source:  Economic  Survey  of Pak;istan  1993-94  and Statistical  Supplement  1992-93. The considerable  fluctuation  in certain series from year to year indicates
that the data may not always  be reliable. The 1993-94  figures  are Budget Projections  and actual data could  be considerably  different. The growth  rates
for  Federal items  are calculated  from 1984-85  to 1992-93. All grovth figures  are calculated  based  on the first and last periods,  except for National
Expenditure  growth,  which is calculated  using  a regression  trend line on a two-period  moving  average  series. Other subsectors  are not showAn  individually,
but are included in the total figures.
22Table  9
PAKISTAN' PUBLIC  EXPENDrrURE  IN AGRICULTlURE
(Development)  Total
Condant Rupees  -million
1982.83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-46  1986-87  1987-88  1988-89  19S9-90  1990-91  1991-92  1992-93  1993-94  Averagc  Growth  R-al
Pxunlab
Agriculture&Credit  215 92  211.79  184.16  225.38  226.99  273.86  124.76  135.57  157.18  138.77  171.21  70.58  187.79  -3.95
Irrigation  424.67  288.29  322.24  272.59  402.51  350.38  182.13  237.11  595.62  545.90  410.55  186.77  36654  -1.47
Total Punjab  7S5.-?  61127  62429  60174  75210  739.76  398.90  460.78  S3792S  76.73  649Z51  309f04  656S.6 
Slndh
Api and Agri Credit  88.85  64.37  71.79  76.51  97.66  13S.05  78.58  73.58  89.70  50.88  59.22  4S.08  30.83
Irrigation  193.57  172.17  189.74  193.97  284.91  262.34  181.10  255.91  313.04  273.46  238.53  22831  232.61  2.51
Tetal Sindh  D7.65  26963  29838  3300  440-61  45S.91  3fU6  393.96  49066  37260  159  2  324L84  367.74  I
NWFP
Agriculture  40.24  48.08  4S.43  47.05  58.77  72.21  90.19  164.71  58.26  142.40  56.64  64.78  75.23  3.41
Irigation  34.22  50.48  55.52  51.82  64.16  92.37  60.92  10539  124.50  145.22  189.46  172.00  82.64  29.70
Total NWFP  11  2  2  12412445  152.04  12242  12242  316-S1  Z22AI  J335  302 08  311 57  202-32  142fi
Balochistan
Crop Agriculture  59.91  53.62  56.56  43.15  56.51  41.01  42.45  41.33  60.24  24.16  41.56  56.23  4732  -1.26
Inrigption  1S.50  122.54  100.83  186.52  156.37  154.57  177.35  16t 12  199.44  36S.59  415.75  243.52  196.96  15.77
Total Balochistan  243 Q  2137.71  221.90  624.  2763  ZM  26492462  2462  423.04QA  49135  36037  29223 
Federal Governnumnt
Food&Agriculture  1879.07  1713.52  1551.57  2349.41  1579.56  1337.06  1181.60  1163.S7  S09.71  1130.17  71168  47931  1400.66  -6.08
Irigation  873.31  894.11  544.85  S67.91  1011.44  608.12  363.69  920.79  775.46  312.07  334.15  507.59  6S236  4.76
Food Storage  219.58  118.76  175.74  47.64  69.83  29.92  331  50.94  31.82  5.28  0.00  0.00  71.17  -9.09
Federal  Subsidies
Fertilizer  Subsidy  1623.00  1220.00  1137.12  1766.69  788.77  1389.24  1428.66  674.84  678.41  1224.00  33323  309.00  104531  .0.%
Tubewell  Subsidy  2.00  13.33  13.33  11.74  12.59  6.40  4.71  4.42  na  0.00  0.00  na  rna  na
Total  Federal  46039  4129.90  366512  4Q-  4  31665.15  162140  3149.9529  29411  2AU  27cL05  1731297 1448  19  32417  .2
Total National Dcv.
Expenditures  6062-00 538900  49SI.OQ  66Q255  5298.52  525956  433740  413A41  42552  468227  3534.13  2954.02  49T705 .42
Total National Agri.
Expenditures  3200  7960295 1166057 12512.32  10631573 LS01Q 1  1342955  992641  10602.12  1102.2Q  994428  781349  10729294  2i2
Source: Economic  Survey of Pakistan, 1993-94. The  growth rates for Federal items are calculated  from 1984-85  to 1992-93. All growth 'igures are calculated
based on the first and last periods,  except for National Expendinure  growth, which  is calculated from a regression  trend line on a tD-period  moving  aveage.
Other subsectors like fisheries, veterinary  etc. are not shown individually but are included in the total figures.
23Subsidies  are in fact a major component  of the overall expenditure  program. The ratio of
current subsidy  to current expenditure  for the provincial  governments,  over the past 12 years, has
varied from 19 percent  to 44 percent. The same ratio for the federal  government  has varied  from 36
percent to 97 percent (Table 10).  Similarly,  development  subsidies  bome almost  exclusively  by the
federal  government  have also been high,  from 24-83 percent of development  expenditure. Subsidies
have  fallen  to some  extent  in recent  years,  both absolutely  and relative  to total expenditure  (Tables 10
and I 1).
Table  10
Povinial/Federal  Expenditure  and Subsidy
(in constant  Rupes -Million)
Year  Provincial  Provincial  Subsidy/  Federal  Fcdcral  Subsidy/
Expend  Subsidy  Expend  Expend  Subsidy  Expend
(Fotal)  (Total)
CURRENT
82-83  2155  na  na  na  na  na
83-84  2462  na  na  na  na  na
84-85  3792  1149  0.30  2917  2744  0.94
85-86  4409  1498  0.40  1498  1318  0.88
86-87  5025  1836  0.37  313  112  0.36
87-88  5129  2278  0.44  535  358  0.67
88-89  4173  1209  0.30  4919  4755  0.97
89-90  2894  na  na  3319  3150  0.94
90-91  3950  975  0.25  2393  2229  0.93
91-92  4236  821  0.19  2085  1914  0.92
92-93  4114  877  0.21  1196  978  0.82
93-9410  3474  963  0.28  540  492  0.91
DEVELOPMENT
82-83  1458  2  .00  4604  1625  0.35
83-84  1259  13  .01  4130  1233  0.30
84-85  1286  13  .01  3665  1151  0.31
85-86  1365  12  .01  5240  1778  0.34
86-87  1633  13  .01  3665  801  0.22
87-88  1638  6  .00  3621  1396  0.38
88-89  1187  5  .00  3150  1433  0.45
89-90  1422  4  .00  2941  652  0.22
90-91  1837  0  0  2422  678  0.28
91-92  1897  0  0  2791  1224  0.44
92-93  1802  0  0  1732  333  0.19
93-94  1306  0  0  1139  309  0.27
Source:  Tables  8 and  9.
'°  The  1993-94  figures  in  Tables  4.4  and  4.5  are  Budget  figures,  and  thus  subject  to major  revision.
24Current subsidies  for food procurement  and price stabilization  have been the government's
cornerstone  for food autarky.  This policy  has reduced  the domestic  price and production variance:  the
standard deviation of wheat production has been less than 8 percent of the mean in  1978-1987
(Pinckney,  1989). Moreover, the government  has insulated  consumers  from major swings in wheat
prices through massive  procurement  and marketing  operations supported by the food subsidy  - 24
percent of production  in 1970-80,  and 31 percent thereafter  (Alderman,  1993). In comparison,  food
procurement  in Bangladesh  and India  have  been below 10 percent  of production  per year.
Tal1e 1
Food  Subsidy  and  Expenditure
(in  Millions  of Constant  Rupees)
Year  Total  Total Current  Subsidy  as % Current  Subsidy  as
Subsidy  Expenditure  Expenditure  % Agriculture
GDP
8123  na  2301  na  na
83-84  na  2572  na  na
84-85  3893  6709  58  4.42
85-86  2816  5907  48  3.00
86-87  1948  5337  37  2.01
87-88  2514  5542  45  2.53
88-89  5960  9092  66  5.63
89-90  2501  5563  45  2.29
90-91  3204  6344  51  2.80
91-92  2735  6321  43  2.18
92-93  1855  5310  35  1.54
93-94  1764  5408  33  1.45
Although the countly has achieved  a satisfactory  level of food security,  the policy of public
intervention  has come with a price. The level of wheat production has remained low because both
farmers  and traders were discouraged  by low prices. Until recently,  Pakistan had used the rationing
system to ensure low wheat flour prices to urban as well as some targeted rural consumers.  The
rationing  system  is now gone,  but it has been replaced  by a program  of open market operation  - buying
post harvest stock and releasing  it later at a pre-determined  fixed margin over procurement  price,
unifornly all  over the  country. Such  practices have inhibited the  growth  of  private storage,
transportation,  and active  private  trade in food grain. The government  has also controlled  international
trade of wheat by prohibiting  exports, and importing  irregularly  to replenish  domestic stocks. Thus,
domestic prices of wheat have been lower than import paiity prices. Meeting this price differential,
along with the cost of storage and maintaining  buffer stocks, has been a heavy fiscal drain for the
government.  The cost of maintaining  food subsidies  has been high,  ranging  up to 66 percent of current
expenditure  C(able  11).
This system is not achieving  its stated goal because the price of flour is already market-
determined. Millers  are absorbing  most of the subsidy  on wheat as rent, and the milling  industry  has
25excess capacity. In  1993-94,  the retail price of flour was 95 percent of the import parity price of
flour", so the effect  on the retail  price  of flour  of the subsidy  is minimal.
Food security is best ensured by raising  the real income of households  and control of wheat
prices runs counter to the goal of raising  the real income of poor farmers. The subsidy regime has
failed  to compensate  for depressed  output prices  for a number  of reasons. Subsidies  on such essential
factors as fertilizer  and seeds distort input  markets. Moreover, government  activities  in procurement,
distribution  and marketing  of inputs are almost always inefficient  and unresponsive  to the needs of
buyers. For example,  the cost of fertilizer  distributed  by government agencies in Pakistan has been
much higher  than the private sector, and this inefficiency  loss is bome by the public exchequer.  Public
seed corporations  have not been effective  either. Most of these corporations  have been running  at a
loss, as shown later.  The farners have  been deprived  of the benefits  of competitively  driven prices and
an active commercial  market.
Cheap inputs (in the short run) also encourage waste through overuse, particularly  by poor
farmers  not well  versed in agronomy.  Fertilizer  and seed subsidies  are essentially  regressive  since they
benefit mostly the  larger farners  that  use  large  amount  of  the  subsidized inputs.  Also,  the
administration  of the subsidy  program encourages  rent-seeking.  In the past, farmers have received
interest-free short term loans, as well as low interest medium - and long-term loans hom  the
nationalized financial institutions.  Some loans  are  not  repaid,  which  implies an  additional
(unintended) subsidy.  Subsidized credit must be rationed, and unequal access to land and power
almost guarantee that large farmers will obtain most of the subsidy. Commercial policy and credit
subsidies have combined to make agricultural machinery very cheap, which has resulted in very
low productivity of  machinery (Ali and Velasco,  1993), while creating incentives to  displace
tenants from land.
It is not even clear that the fetilizer subsidy  boosted fertilizer  consumption. The subsidy  has
represented  the largest  fiscal  outlay  of the governmcnt  after the food subsidy.  However, its benefit  over
a long period is questionable.  There is a remarkable  lack of congruity  between  fertilizer  subsidy  and use
of fertilizer  - the corTelation  being -0.51 (Figure  2).  12 Fertilizer  usage rates are apparently  not affected
by the subsidy. Perhaps in recognition  of this, fertilizer  subsidies  are being cut and are expected to be
phased  out completely  by 1995.
11  The  import  parity  price  of flour  is computed  as  the  import  parity  price of wheat  plus milling and distnbution
charges.
12 Pearson  correlation  coefficient  between  subsidy  and fertilizer  consumption.
26Figure 2
Fertilizer  Subsidy  and Consumption  in Pakistan
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The shortfall between water charges and expenditure  on irrgation also represents a major
subsidy  The active market for  tubewell water shows that fanrners  are willing to pay more for
water  than  the  current  price. Thiis underpnicing has  led  to  inefficient overuse  of  water,
deterioration in the system resulting from the squeeze on O&M expenditure,  and massive rent
seeking,  with most of the rents going to large fiarmers  and irrgation officials.
Electricity is also a big hidden subsidy.  It is provided at a concessional  rate for operating
electric tubeweUls.  Electricity  thefis are also considerable. However, as the current power crisis
in Pakdistan  shows, this subsidy  is of dubious benefit  to farmers. Rural areas can be without power
fior  up to 12 hours per dayr.  Capital  expenditure  on electricity  generation has been crowsded  out by
the low rate of cost  recovery.
lnadeguate Expenditure
Public expenditure has been insufficient in other areas.  Naturl  resource degradation
arising from waterlogging  and salinit,y  has not been sulfficiently  addressed.  To the extent that
these problems  are due to inladequate  drainage (a public good), then the govrnment  can play an
increased role  At the same time, the government has provided funds for the development and
maintenance of prnvate tubewells, even though most of the benefits of tubewells  are privately
appropriated (althoug  there may be some public  benefit of tubewells arising from lowering of
water tables).
Particularly  serious  iS the  neglect  of  operaions  and  maintenance  expenditure  on  the
irrigation  system,  which  has  consequently  deteriorated  (Table  12).  The  shortfal  vanes  by
province,  and is as high as 37 percent  in Sind, and stems fran  low  water rates  and inadequate
assessent  and coilection of charges B In addition, revenue does not go directly to the Provincial
Irrigation Departmns,  which creates poor collection incentivres.
13Mor,eoier.  levd  reqird  n  tindlude  public  tubewens,  the assumption  tbat heewould be privatie.
But privaizton  of grudwaeubees  is slowsrta  planned, and the 0&  ne:eds  oflhs  tuibewels  has been
conieable.
27Tablc  12: O&M Expcnditurc  and  Rcquircmcnls
(in Million Currciit Rupecs)
Fiscal Ycar  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Rcquiremcnts  1704  1875  2161  2408  2617
Expcnditure  1704  1513  1617  1718  1985
ShortfalI(/)  0  -19  -25  -29  -L4
Sourcc: World Bank (1994)
Rural  infrastructure  deficiencies  have  also  been  widely  documented.  Witness  the  road
density  in Pakistani  Punjab,  which  is just  one  half of the  road  density  in Indian  Punjab.  Road
maintenance  expenditure has been seriously neglected;  it was Rs  1.3 billion in  1990-91, far short
of the  Rs  8  billion required  for  proper  maintenance  of the  road  network.  It  is also  clear  that
education spending has been seriously neglected.
Public Enterprises in Agriculture
Although the expenditure on public enterprises is not included in the buadget,  theii losses are
met mostly by borrowing from banks guaranteed by the government, and sometimes by direct support.
Guaranteed borrowing is effectively  part of the fiscal deficit and crowds out the private sector from the
credit market.  Public enterprises often have an undesirable financial structure,  with little equity and
heavy reliance on short-term public debt.
There are many public institutions in Pakistan for implementing governnent  interventions in
agricultural markets, including output market price control, control of input supplies, and external trade
of agriculture output.  A host of public sector corporations were set up, for reasons such as providing
cheap food to  urban consumers and guarding the farmer's  against private  'exploitation'.  Notable
among  these  agencies  are  the  Punjab  Seed  Corporation  (PSC),  the  Sind  Agricultural  Services
Organization (SASO), Punjab Agricultural Development and Supplies Corporation (PADSC) Pakistan
Agricultural  Services  and  Storage  Corporation  (PASSCO),  Agriculture  Development  Authority
(ADA), Cotton Export Corporation (CEC), and Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan (RECP).  All
are inefficient, with a high cost of operation compared to the private sector. For example, a study in
1989 showed that the private rice mills operated  at 40 percent less cost  than the RECP.  Table  13
summnarizes  the operating profit and losses of four major agriculture sector corporations in Pakistan.
28Table 13
Consolidated  Profit  & Loss  of Major  Public  Corporations
in the Agriculturc Sector
(in Million Currcnt Rupccs)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
PSC  (2.58)  (0.97)  15.14  9.75  18.79  26.75  -
SASO  (10.01)  (42.37)  (50.84)  (40.82)  (58.77)  -
PADSC  - _  (13.36)  16.04
PASSCO  (169.25)  79.87  85.96  55.80  (89.39)
The case of the Punjab Seed Corporation (PSC) is typical.  Audited accounts of the PSC for
the past six years show that the company had losses in the early years, but tumed around later on.  On
the surface, this corporation does not seem to  have done too  badly in the recent years. However,
certain expenditure items have not been taken into account, whose inclusion would in all probability
depress  the  performance  picture.  First,  the  seed  farmns acquired  from  the  Punjab  Agriculture
Development and Supplies Corporation (PADSC) have not  been valued.  The implicit land rent of
these  farms  must  be  added  to  the  operating  costs  to  get  a  true  estimate  of  costs.  Second,  the
corporation's loans from the nationalized banks have been underwritten by the government at around
12.5 percent, which amounts to  an indirect subsidy. Third, the corporation had borrowed working
capital of Rs.50 mnillion  from the Governnent  of Punjab, but has not paid the interest on this loan.
Fourth, the corporation receives occasional grants from the Government of Punjab for expansion of
facilities.
Sind Agricultural Supplies Corporation distributes fertilizer and seeds to farmers in Sind. The
corporation receives reimbursement of the distribution costs on a predetermined formula, which is not
sufficient. As a  -esult, the organization has had operating losses in all the years for which data was
available  (1989-93).
Available data for the Punjab Agricultural Development and Supplies Corporation also show
net operating losses.  The positive profit shown for  1993-194 is merely a  figure projected by the
corporation.  The  Pakistan  Agricultural Storage  and  Services Corporation,  which  is  engaged  in
procuring, preserving, storing, and distributing  food grains (especially  wheat) has been operating with a
budget close to 3 billion rupees.  The operating finances of this organization shows major losses prior
to 1990. It recovered slightly in 1992 and 1993, but again went in the red in 1993.
The  rationale  for  the  government  providing  marketing  services  in  an  economy  not
characterized by market failure is extremely tenuous. A review of marketing institutions by the World
Bank in 199014  has indicated that problems can generally arise with parastatal marketing in developing
countries, some of which are evident in Pakistan. First, under a system of controlled prices, inadequate
marketing margins are the primary reason for the inadequacy of marketing services provided by both
the public and private marketing channels. In Pakistan, fertilizer and seed are heavily subsidized and
14 Agricultural  Marketing:  The World  Bank  Experience,  1974-85  (1990),  Operations  Evaluation  Department,  The
World  Bank,  Washington.  D. C.
29the state organizations  (PSC, PADSC, SASO,  and so on) have difficudty  in realizing their full
operational  costs from the consumers. The prices set by the government  are also imposed on the
private sector, either through adminisered pnces or by the  presence of government marketing
agencies. This has resulted  in inefliciency  of supply,  such as untimely  avaiability,  poor distnbution  in
low demand  areas,  amid  so on.
Second,  for large parastatals,  the cost of inefficient  opeation is reflected  both in the price and
the level  of service.  There is evidence  that private  sector prices  have been  less  than state enterprises  in
many  instances  of distnbution  of fertilizer  and seeds. Parastatals  have a poor record of cost control,
because they  usually  practice  'tost-plus" pricing,  which  gives managers  no incentive  to control costs.
Even with the presence  of parastals,  private sector marketing  channels  have continued to service
farmers, and are often preferred by then.  This seriously calls into question the  argument that
expansion  of public-sector  marketing  services  is needed  to check alleged  exploitation  by merchants
So, there is no justification  for the public  sector role in marketing. The resources  devoted to them
could have been directed  towards expenditure  that would  benefit agriculture,  such as promoting  the
adoption  of producivwi-enhancing  technology  by farmers,  building  infiastructure  to link markets,  and
supporting  private  entrepreneurship.
To  conclude this section, the implication is that  the  large public-sector role in  input
marketing, storage, supplies, and similar  functions  will have to be cut, freeing  resources for other
needed areas, while reducing crowding out of the private sector in these activities. The public-
sector's role has risen unnecessarily  and the need is now for less, but better govemmentn  The
continued presence of  subsidies and regulations propping up  state enterprises slows  market
development and  impedes the  transmission of  prices  to  agricultural producers  (through
inefficiencies,  corruption in procurement, and so on).
There are some areas where an increased  role for government is necessary, specifically  to
strengthen market institutions. There is a glaring need to strengthen individual  property rights to
land, which will allow  the  market  economy to  function correctly. Another  key  issue  of
institutional development is to  decentralize agricultural support services - such as rural credit,
water user groups, and farmer groups.
The government  of Pakistan's active role in agriculture  has for the most part not benefited
the sector. What is the best way for the government  to proceed? We outline a program of policy
and institutional  reforms that are urgently needed to create an enabling envirornent  for private
agriculture  while ensuring  appropriate goverrnment  interventions.
IV.  Needed Reforms "
Price and Trade Policy: In keeping with structural reforms, output prices need to be transmitted
to farmers with least distortion.  Price supports and controls, which cause distortions in market
signals and huge fiscal costs, need to be phased out.  The government aim of reducing inter- and
intra- year price fluctuations can  be achieved by  other  more cost  effective means, such as
promoting on-farm storage, private-sector storage, and fiitures trading.  The govemment must
See WPS1407  for further details of the needed reforms.
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no  import restrictions on  wheat and flour.  It  would be desirable to  remove protection of
sugarcane through high support prices and sugar import restrictions, allowing diversion  of scarce
resources (such as water and land)  to more efficient  uses.
Trade reform will have to be completed speedily. In particular, taxes on cotton exports,
duties on sugar imports, and quantitative  restrictions on both will have to be removed; any loss of
revenue would be offset by removing  the wheat subsidy. The terms of trade for agriculture will
have to be corrected by lowering industrial protection.  The combined effect of price and trade
reform  will be to improve  the allocation of resources and the profitability  of agriculture.
The government will need to  halt the  sort of  rmicro-management  that  can be better
undertaken by the private sector.  Importation of fertilizer  is a prime example. There is also no
need for government presence  in the marketing  of improved  (certified) seed.
Larnd  reform is a long-term project which will require careful consideration.  However,
some immediate measures would be highly desirable to  correct land market distortions, which
include low machinery prices (often effectively  zero through the use of delinquent loans to buy
machinery),  and unequal access to credit (which makes it difficult for small farmers to  expand
their holdings). These reforns would increase opportunities  available for farming,  and for wage
labor on employment-intensive  farms. The land title process can be modernized and streamlined,
including  the establishment  of a system of permanent title deeds to land.  Security of tenure shall
be assured, without creating further disincentives  to rent-out land. This would facilitate  long-term
(especially  natural resource management)  investments. The niinimal  goal of land market reforms
must be to ensure that land is operated and managed by the most efficient user.  A pre-requisite
for this is full economic pricing of water & mechanized  inputs.  With water charges currently so
low, there is little incentive  to use the water rights, attached to land in efficient fashion. When
these reforms are coupled with ending the use of land as a tax  shelter and credit vehicle, the
efficiency  of land allocation  will greatly improve.
It will be desirable to  end directed credit in any form.  Groups finding it hard to gain
access to  credit could perhaps be helped by a scheme to underwrite the setup costs of credit.
Such assistance would be one-time and reduce the transaction costs, and the best option is not to
have any recurrent subsidy. Credit reforms are essential  to increase  investment in the sector.
Institutional  Reforms: Most of Pakistan's agriculture  has entered a post-green revolution stage of
development that requires new strategies to enhance input efficiency and maintain and improve
the quality of the resource base.  By most measures of productivity,  Pakistan's institutions  have
not evolved to meet this challenge.
Irrigation should undergo a demand-based decentralization,  through the development of
water user associations  (WUAs)  at distributary  level. These  WUAs would be participatory  farmer
organizations that will assume responsibility for downstream operations and maintenance of
irrigation systems.  Upstream at canal command would be the responsibility of  conunercially
oriented public utilities (Pus), and explicit contractual obligations would exist between the Pus
31and the WUAs.  At provincial  level, autonomous water authorities would be responsible for major
provincial  storages,  link  canals,  off-farm  and  provincial  drains,  and  flood  control  and
management.
Irrigation charges can be raised to  reflect the  cost of provision, the quality of  service
provided, and the cost of competing alternatives.  Disputes between the different groups in the
irrigation  system will be resolved by powerful regulatory authorities, free from political influence.
A  legal and  institutional framework for  the  market  exchange of  water  rights will  also  be
established.  Off-farm  drainage,  a  public  good,  will  continue  to  be  the  responsibility of
government. Costs of drainage can be recovered from farmers.
These reforms will increase the efficiency  of water use, ensure that the cost of water truly
reflects its economic cost, reduce waterlogging and salinity problems, and will allow water to go
to its most efficient user via the sale of water rights.
Support for research should continue, but expenditure needs to  be restructured so that
salaries do  not soak up most of the available funds.  Research institutions will be made more
autonomous, salary restrictions lifted, and other funding sources mobilized.  Greater importance
should be attached to research in cropping systems. Publicly funded research will stress growth-
enhancing  public goods, environmental  impact, and poverty reduction.
Joint  public-private funding of  research  is also  desirable.  Private  and  public sector
research financing could, where possible, be on  a competitive basis, meaning that  funding to
institutions would be on  the basis of performance.  Coordination between different research
institutions will have to be improved, and unnecessary duplication  avoided.
Adaptive research (which would be a part of the extension service, outlined next) would
provide site-  and  season-specific recommendations and  information to  adapt  them  to  each
farmer's  needs.  Incentives could be provided for greater participation of farmers in defining
research priorities.
With no-one happy with the performance of the  extension service, major reform of the
service is a top priority. The notion of extension as a top-down supply-driven  process needs to be
revised.  The goal should instead be to  create a  demand for information amongst farmers, a
demand which could then be satisfied  by extension workers.  The service should concentrate more
on  participatory problem solving with farmers  at  the  local level, which  means substantially
improving education levels of farmers and extension workers.
The extension service will have to  be reduced in size.  Instead of too  many extension
agents with too little training, there should be fewer, better qualified agents.  Extension services
will have to be geared to problems of all farming systems (including  livestock, forestry, and water
management) and not just major crops. It will be desirable to have a more diversified  approach to
extension -- one that responds to varying needs of farmers, and uses various available sources of
extension services, including  the private sector.
32Some extension is already being undertaken by the private sector companies. These and
NGOs could be encouraged  to increase  the provision of extension  services. A system of advisory
services by adaptive research institutions  to medium  and large farmers on payment of fees could
be encouraged.
The  government's  role  in  rural  infrastructure provision  needs  to  be  strengthened.
Increased  revenue  from  the  tax  reforms  and  savings  from  the  rationalization of  public
expenditures  on agriculture could be used to finance road work.  Farm to village roads would
improve the distribution of inputs and marketability of outputs.  The transition to  high value
(often perishable)  foods, would be greatly facilitated  by better roads.
More emphasis on  natural resource management problems in  agriculture is  required.
policy  interventions  for natural resource management  and the environment  will be based on three
principles (a) Price adjustments for scarce natural resources in order to  provide appropriate
conservation incentives (b)  identifying regulatory mechanisms which  could  be  effective in
addressing  market failure, bearing in mind the poor record of existing regulatory agencies and (c)
restructuring  public  expenditures  to focus on natural resource management  priorities.
In environment and natural resource management, market failure is more likely to  be a
problem.  Many market failures, such as the excessive application of harmful pesticides, will
require public regulation.  Increased pesticide use has created growing resistance among pests,
and destroyed natural predators.  Integrated pest management would be more effective and
environmentally  friendly,  as well as consistent  with the demands of Pakistan's export markets. An
effective  institu.ional  mechanism  for transmitting  knowledge about integrated pest management  is
essential. There may  be a case for linking  subsidies  to activities  with positive externalities,  such as
soil conservation  techniques.
lack of property rights and institutions  to manage common property resources can inflict
on-site damage and crate negative externalities. Successful  watershed management  projects need
to  be extended.  project design should be sensitive  to  the creation of community management
institutions to  address common property resource management problems.  Great interventions
should  take the form of providing  incentives  for the adoption of sustainable  resource management
techniques.  New technologies which can enhance the  physical status of  common property
resources e encouraged.
To conclude, defining the appropriate role for government will be the comerstone of the
reform program.  The government's appropriate role is to  encourage the  development of  a
smoothly functioning  market, through institutional  and regulatory reforms that facilitate private
sector activities and market efficiency. Where market failure is not an issue, and govermnent
inefficiency is  clearly evident, government's role will be  drastically reduced.  Government
spending  will have to focus on public  goods and market failures, and not on activities  better suited
to the private sector.  In poverty and the environment,  the government will continue to have an
active role.
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